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ABSTRACT 
 
There is no judicial consensus about what test to apply 
when plaintiffs attempt to obtain the identity of an 
anonymous Internet user during discovery in an online 
defamation case. In July 2010, the Ninth Circuit became 
the first federal appeals court to devise an articulable test 
to determine when a plaintiff may compel disclosure of an 
online commentator. Previously, federal courts had applied 
inconsistent balancing tests to determine whether 
disclosure was appropriate. In In re Anonymous Online 
Speakers, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the Delaware state-
court standard from Doe v. Cahill but applied this test in a 
way that made it easier for commercial defamation 
plaintiffs to obtain the identity of anonymous defendants. 
This Article surveys the prevalent online defamation cases, 
summarizing the three primary judicial tests applied by 
state courts and positing that other circuits likely will adopt 
the reasoning set forth in Anonymous Online Speakers for 
commercial online speech. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With the proliferation of Internet chat rooms and message 
boards, courts must increasingly balance plaintiffs’ right to seek 
redress for defamatory speech with a potential defendant’s First 
Amendment right to engage in anonymous free speech. While state 
courts have established various standards to determine when a 
plaintiff may compel disclosure of an online commentator, before 
Anonymous Online Speakers,1 only two federal circuit courts had 
addressed anonymous online commercial speech.2
                                                                                                         
1  In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2010), opinion 
withdrawn and superseded by In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 
2011 WL 61635 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011). 
 The courts in 
both of these cases neglected to articulate a standard for 
2  See Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2009); 
NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998). Few federal courts 
have decided an appropriate standard for disclosure of anonymous Internet 
speakers because appellate courts rarely consider interlocutory review of 
discovery disputes under the collateral order doctrine. See Mohawk Industries, 
Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S.Ct. 599, 609 (2009) (reiterating that the class of 
appealable orders must remain “narrow and selective in its membership”).  
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determining when disclosure of a poster’s identity was appropriate.  
In formulating its test, the district court in Anonymous Online 
Speakers relied on the “summary judgment” standard articulated in 
Doe v. Cahill: in order to disclose the identity of an online 
commentator, plaintiffs must survive a hypothetical motion for 
summary judgment by making a prima facie showing for each 
element of the claim.3
While the Ninth Circuit did not reverse the lower court’s 
application of the Cahill summary judgment standard, the Court 
suggested that Cahill’s standard, although potentially appropriate 
for political speech, does not apply to commercial speech. The 
Court instead advocated for an attenuated summary judgment 
standard where the nature of the speech in question should be the 
primary deciding factor. Noting a distinction between commercial 
speech and non-commercial speech, the Court determined that the 
identity of an alleged defamer should be revealed with increased 
ease in commercial speech cases.
 While the Cahill court required a 
defamation plaintiff to make a substantial legal and factual 
showing that the complaint had sufficient merit before the court 
would unmask an anonymous Internet speaker, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to adopt such a clearly defined standard.  
4
 
 
I. INTERNET ANONYMITY AS A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT 
 
 Courts have long protected anonymous speech, recognizing 
that “an author’s decision to remain anonymous is an aspect of the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”5
                                                                                                         
3  Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 459 (Del. 2005). 
 As 
4  The original, and presently used, definition of commercial speech is 
"speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 376 (1973); 
see also Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980) (commercial speech is "related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience…").  
5  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43 (1995) 
(invalidating an Ohio election law that prohibited the circulation of anonymous 
leaflets in connection with political campaigns). See also Talley v. California, 
362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (invalidating a city ordinance that prohibited the 
distribution of any handbill in the city unless the name and address of the author, 
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electronic communication became more prevalent, the U.S. 
Supreme Court responded by holding that online speech retains the 
same protections as other forms of speech.6 In McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ability 
to speak anonymously on the Internet promotes the robust 
exchange of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves 
freely without a fear of retaliation that could lead to the chilling of 
online speech.7
Nevertheless, the right to anonymous speech is a qualified 
privilege that extends only so far. Courts have consistently held 
“[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any constitutional problem.”
  
8 For example, 
fighting words “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”9
The tort of defamation seeks to address intentionally or 
negligently injurious statements. To create liability for defamation 
there must be a false and defamatory statement concerning 
another; an unprivileged publication to a third party; fault 
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher with 
respect to the act of publication; and either actionability of the 
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special 
harm caused by the publication.
 
10 A communication is defamatory 
if it “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in 
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him.”11
The Supreme Court has been careful to draw distinctions 
between politically motivated defamatory speech and 
  
                                                                                                         
sponsor, or preparer was identified).  
6  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997) (noting that “our cases provide 
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied” to online speech).  
7  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).  
8  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).  
9  Id. at 572. 
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).  
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
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commercially motivated defamatory speech; the latter is not 
granted the same level of First Amendment protection. In fact, 
before 1976, the Supreme Court assumed that commercial speech 
fell outside the realm of First Amendment protection.12 In 1976 the 
Supreme Court held that free‐enterprise depended on the free flow 
of information and that truthful, non-misleading advertising was 
entitled to First Amendment protection.13 The Court re-established 
its position in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission 
of New York by instituting a four-part test that emphasized the 
accuracy and lawfulness of the advertising.14 Commercial speech
Courts have encountered new challenges when applying First 
Amendment principles in the online context. While some courts 
have found the immediacy and size of the Internet increases the 
harm of defamatory speech,
 
has never enjoyed the same degree of protection given to political 
expression. 
15 others have found the exact 
opposite, commenting that Internet speech is full of hyperbole, 
sarcasm and invective language not taken seriously by any 
reasonable reader.16
                                                                                                         
12 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see also Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  
 For example, if readers do not take online 
commentary seriously, a plaintiff may not be sufficiently harmed 
13 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65. 
14 Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
15 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 
WL 1210372, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) rev’d on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. 
v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d 377 (2001). “In 
this age of communication in cyberspace, the potential dangers that could flow 
from the dissemination of such information increase exponentially as the 
proliferation of shareholder chat rooms continues unabated, and more and more 
traders utilize the Internet as a means of buying and selling stocks. As such, the 
wrongful dissemination of such information through the Internet may also fall 
outside the scope of First Amendment protections.”  
16 See Global Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 
(C.D. Cal. 2001). Internet defamation cases must be viewed in light of the fact 
that bulletin boards and chat rooms “are often the repository of a wide range of 
casual, emotive, and imprecise speech,” and recipients of any harmful or 
offensive statements “do not necessarily attribute the same level of credence to 
the statements that they would accord to statements made in other contexts.” 
MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 522 (2d ed. 2001).  
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to merit recovery for the tort of defamation. On the other hand, 
language that may not have been defamatory if spoken or 
published on paper can become defamatory if broadcasted to an 
audience of millions. 
 
II. THE BALANCING ACT: THE TESTS AND HOW THEY COMPARE 
 
When a plaintiff alleges Internet defamation but does not know 
the identity of his or her defamer, he or she must first serve a 
subpoena on the website host or the Internet service provider (ISP) 
asking for the release of the potential defendant’s identity.17
 
 Many 
ISPs oppose the request in an attempt to protect their customers’ 
privacy. The court must then hold a hearing to determine the 
propriety of disclosure. It is in this context that the courts must 
apply a balancing test between the plaintiffs’ rights to be free from 
defamatory conduct and the defendants’ rights to anonymous free 
speech. 
A.  Federal Courts 
 
Because no federal court had articulated a standard for when 
unmasking an anonymous Internet speaker is appropriate, most 
courts looked to state-court tests for guidance. In fact, only two 
federal cases have addressed the issue of revealing the identity of 
an anonymous Internet user in a defamation case: NLRB v. 
Midland Daily News18 and Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.19
In Midland Daily News, a government agency moved to 
compel a newspaper to answer a subpoena for the identity of an 
anonymous advertiser.
  
20 The district court and the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied this request.21
                                                                                                         
17 Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, online 
publishers (ISPs) enjoy immunity from civil liability for defamatory content 
posted by third parties. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). As such, ISPs are not the 
targeted defendants in defamation suits.  
 As the court of appeals 
18 See NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998). 
19 See Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2009). 
20 Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d at 472-73. 
21 Id. at 472. 
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explained, permitting the NLRB to obtain the identity of Midland’s 
advertiser without requiring it to demonstrate a reasonable basis 
for seeking such information would have an unconstitutional 
chilling effect on the newspaper’s ability to publish lawful 
advertisements.22 The plaintiff in this case facially failed to 
demonstrate a substantial state interest that outweighed the danger 
to the free speech rights of Midland, its anonymous advertiser, and 
to countless other similarly situated entities across the nation.23 In 
addition, the court found that NLRB could have used less-
extensive and less-intrusive means to access the information it 
desired.24
In Lefkoe, the Fourth Circuit permitted the deposition of an 
anonymous speaker in a securities-fraud suit.
  
25 The court utilized 
an extremely lenient disclosure standard, reasoning that once the 
plaintiff carries his or her burden and shows that the information 
held by the Doe Client “could be relevant and useful” to the 
defense of the litigation, the governmental interest in providing a 
fair trial is served by unveiling the identity of the anonymous 
speaker.26
Neither federal appeals court articulated with any degree of 
precision how lower courts should weigh the First Amendment 
rights of anonymous speakers against the right of identity 
disclosure for defamation plaintiffs. 
 
 
B.  State Courts 
 
State courts have applied three distinct tests to determine when 
a plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to merit a court-issued 
motion to compel disclosure of the identity of an anonymous 
poster. Courts have required plaintiffs to demonstrate either (1) a 
good faith basis warranting disclosure; (2) evidence sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss before allowing disclosure; or  
(3) evidence sufficient to survive a hypothetical motion for 
                                                                                                         
22 Id. at 475. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 248 (4th Cir. 2009).  
26 Id. at 249.  
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summary judgment. The former asks for the least stringent proof, 
while the latter requires the most robust proof from the plaintiff.  
 
1. The Good Faith Standard 
 
The good faith standard, espoused in In re Subpoena Duces 
Tecum to America Online, Inc., requires the plaintiff to show only 
that his claim was made in good faith and not out of intent to 
harass the defendant.27 In America Online, the plaintiffs, under the 
pseudonym of “Anonymously Publicly Traded Company,” alleged 
that several anonymous posters (referred to as “John Does”) 
published defamatory material misrepresentations and confidential 
material insider information in various Internet chat rooms and 
sought to discover the identity of these anonymous posters.28 In 
considering the plaintiff’s request, the court applied a balancing 
test focused on “whether a state’s interest in protecting its citizens 
against potentially actionable communications on the Internet is 
sufficient to outweigh the right to anonymously speak [through the 
Internet].”29 Under this standard, a plaintiff must only demonstrate 
that a cause of action may exist in order for the court to abridge the 
right to communicate anonymously on the Internet.30
In articulating the precise scope of this “good faith” standard, 
the court determined that the party requesting the subpoena must 
have a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the 
victim of actionable conduct and that the subpoenaed identity 
information is “centrally needed to advance that claim.”
  
31 The 
court determined this good faith basis was met, denied America 
Online’s motion to quash the subpoena, and ordered disclosure of 
the identities of the John Does.32
 Other courts have rejected the good faith standard as setting 
the bar too low to protect a defendant's First Amendment right to 
 
                                                                                                         
27 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 
1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000). 
28 Id. at *1. 
29 Id. at *5. 
30 Am. Online, 2000 WL 1210372, at *7.  
31 Id. at *8.  
32 Id.  
8
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speak anonymously on the Internet.33
 
 
2. The Prima Facie Case Standard 
 
In Dendrite International v. Doe No. 3, the plaintiff, a 
corporation, sought a discovery request to ascertain the identity of 
a certain John Doe No. 3 from an ISP, Yahoo!, because of alleged 
defamation and other actionable statements made on a Yahoo! 
bulletin board.34 The Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate 
Division applied a prima facie case standard, which requires 
plaintiffs to satisfy a four-prong test akin to resisting a motion to 
dismiss. The court held that the plaintiff must support his or her 
claim with a prima facie evidentiary showing such that the action 
can withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.35
In order to satisfy the test, the court determined that plaintiffs 
must first “undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that 
they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of 
disclosure.”
  
36 This step should include posting a message of 
notification of the identity request on the ISP’s message board and 
the withholding of any further legal action to allow the John Doe 
defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve an 
opposition.37  
The second step requires the plaintiff to identify the precise 
alleged actionable speech made by each anonymous poster.38 The 
plaintiff met this burden by (1) identifying specific statements as 
purportedly defamatory; (2) identifying John Doe No. 3 as the 
speaker; and (3) establishing that the statements were in fact 
published on Yahoo!'s bulletin board.39 
                                                                                                         
33 See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 462 (Del. 2005). 
Third, before a court will order identity disclosure, the plaintiff 
must set forth a prima facie cause of action that can withstand a 
34 Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760, n. 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001). 
35 Id. at 760.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 770.  
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motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.40  
Fourth, if the plaintiff has presented a sufficient cause of 
action, the court should then balance the defendant’s First 
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of 
the case presented and the necessity of the identity disclosure to 
the plaintiff’s ability to properly proceed.41 Under the Dendrite 
test, this final balancing test does not occur until a prima facie 
claim of defamation has been established.42 The court largely 
based its opinion on a concern for discovery abuse by disgruntled 
plaintiffs looking to harass, intimidate or retaliate.43
Based on this test, the court determined that the motion judge 
appropriately concluded that Dendrite failed to establish a 
sufficient nexus between John Doe No. 3’s statements and 
Dendrite's allegations of harm; therefore, disclosure of John Doe 
No. 3’s identity was not warranted.
 
44
Compared to the good faith standard, Dendrite’s prima facie 
case standard demands much more of a plaintiff seeking disclosure 
of the identity of an anonymous speaker. Even after the plaintiff 
has presented sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss, 
the court may still balance the right of disclosure against the 
anonymous speaker’s First Amendment rights. Such a requirement 
asks for much more than a mere “good faith” claim.  
  
 
3. The Summary Judgment Standard in Doe v. Cahill 
 
The Supreme Court of Delaware became the first state supreme 
court to hear a request for disclosure of an online defamation 
defendant in Doe v. Cahill.45
                                                                                                         
40 Id. at 760. 
 The court held that, in order to 
disclose the identity of an online commentator, plaintiffs must 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 770.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 771.  
45 Monique C.M. Leahy, Cause of Action for Internet Defamation: 
Discovery of Anonymous Posters and Protective Orders, 32 CAUSES OF ACTION 
2d 281 § 36, (originally published 2006; updated September 2010).  
10
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survive a hypothetical motion for summary judgment by making a 
prima facie showing for each element of the claim.46
In Doe v. Cahill, a city councilman sued John Doe defendants 
for defamation after they allegedly posted defamatory comments 
on a local political website alleging that Mr. Cahill’s mental 
condition was deteriorating and his leadership failing.
 
47 The 
plaintiff subpoenaed the ISP for the IP addresses and identities of 
the bloggers.48 The court recognized that granting the subpoena 
might chill political speech in violation of the First Amendment, 
ultimately holding that the summary judgment standard “more 
appropriately balances a defamation plaintiff’s right to protect his 
reputation and a defendant’s right to speak anonymously.”49 In 
reaching its conclusion, the court determined that no reasonable 
person could have interpreted Doe’s statements as defamatory as 
they were no more than an “unfounded and unconvincing 
opinion.”50 Such statements cannot give rise to a prima facie case 
for defamation liability.51
The court found Dendrite’s four-part test unnecessary, 
adopting only parts one and three. In particular, the court 
eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff set forth the exact 
statements made by the anonymous poster because that portion is 
“subsumed in the summary judgment inquiry.”
 
52 The court further 
found that part four “adds no protection above and beyond that of 
the summary judgment test,” needlessly complicating the 
analysis.53 In sum, in order to satisfy the summary judgment 
standard, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each 
element and give notice to the speaker.54
 
 
                                                                                                         
46 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).  
47 Id. at 454.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 462. 
50 Id. at 467. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 461.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 463-64 (“A public figure defamation plaintiff must only plead and 
prove facts with regard to elements of the claim that are within his control.”).  
11
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III. INTERPRETATION OF CAHILL IN ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEAKERS 
 
In In re Anonymous Online Speakers, the commercial 
defamation in question was an allegation that defendant, Signature 
Management TEAM, LLC (TEAM), had created an online smear 
campaign against the corporate plaintiff, Quixtar, Inc.55 Quixtar 
alleged that the defamation was effected through anonymous 
postings disparaging Quixtar and its business practices.56 During 
discovery, Quixtar requested TEAM release the identities of five 
anonymous online posters, alleged employees of the company. 57 
TEAM refused, so Quixtar filed a motion to compel disclosure in 
the District Court of Nevada.58 Based on the test announced in Doe 
v. Cahill, the district court ordered TEAM to release the identities 
of three of the five pseudonyms.59
Both Quixtar and TEAM petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ 
of mandamus challenging the order to release the identities.
  
60 
While the Ninth Circuit denied both writs for mandamus, it did so 
based on the fact that neither party had demonstrated a need for the 
extraordinary remedy of mandamus.61
                                                                                                         
55 In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2010) 
opinion withdrawn and superseded by In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 
09-71265, 2011 WL 61635, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011). 
 As the district court’s 
56 Anonymous Online, 2011 WL 61635, at *1 (the claims were based on 
comments such as “Quixtar has regularly, but secretly, acknowledged that its 
products are overpriced and not sellable”; “Quixtar refused to pay bonuses to 
IBOs in good standing”; Quixtar “terminated IBOs without due process”; 
“Quixtar currently suffers from systemic dishonesty”; and “Quixtar is aware of, 
approves, promotes, and facilitates the systematic noncompliance with the FTC's 
Amway rules.”) 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at *5.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 In federal courts, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 provides that appellate review of 
lower-court decisions should be postponed until after a final judgment has been 
rendered in the lower court. A writ of mandamus offers an exception to this rule 
and allows a dissatisfied party to appeal a decision before the trial proceeds. 
However, such an order is issued only in exceptional circumstances. See Kerr v. 
U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). See also Kathryn Freund, Ninth 
Circuit Argues for Less Stringent Test for Protecting Anonymous Online 
Commercial Speech, JOLT DIGEST, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (July 27, 2010, 9:19 
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decision was not “clearly erroneous as a matter of law,” the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the lower court’s order.62
Nevertheless, the court determined that where commercial 
speech is at issue, the 
 
Cahill
The Ninth Circuit recognized that it had not previously 
considered First Amendment claims of an anonymous non-party 
speaker on the Internet in a circumstance involving commercial 
speech and noted that previous commercial speech cases failed to 
establish a relevant standard.
 test requires too much of a showing 
by the plaintiff. While the Ninth Circuit refrained from overturning 
the district court’s usage of the summary judgment standard from 
Cahill, the court nevertheless held the standard to be too strict for 
commercial defamation actions.  
63 After raising and dismissing various 
tests, including the Dendrite “prima facie” standard and the 
America Online “good faith” standard, the court found the Cahill 
standard to be “the most exacting,”64 but considered it too strict of 
a standard for commercial speech. The court noted that because 
Cahill addresses political speech, the heightened summary 
judgment standard was appropriate, but the court found that when 
commercial speech is balanced against a discretionary discovery 
order under Federal Rule of Procedure 26, “Cahill’s bar extends 
too far.”65 The court reasoned that because of the lesser 
constitutional protection afforded commercial speech, a lower bar 
to reveal the identities of the anonymous posters was more 
appropriate.66
In limiting Cahill’s application to political speech, the court 
judged the degree of protection given to online speakers by “the 
impact the speech has on the other party rather than the intent of 
the speaker.”
 
67
                                                                                                         
PM), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/9th-circuit/in-re-anonymous-online-
speakers. 
 The court explicitly clarified that if the lower court 
had refused to unmask the anonymous speakers, “its application of 
62 Anonymous Online, 2011 WL 61635, at *7.  
63 Id. at *4.  
64 Id. at *5.  
65 Id. at *6.  
66 Id.  
67 See Freund, supra note 60.  
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the wrong test could have rendered that decision reversible.”68
Anonymous Online’s “new” standard considers the nature of 
the speech as the primary driving force in balancing the rights of 
anonymous speakers in discovery disputes, based upon the idea 
that “the specific circumstances surrounding the speech serve to 
give context to the balancing exercise.”
  
69 Commercial speech, as 
opposed to political speech, enjoys a “limited measure of 
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale 
of First Amendment values.”70 This “subordinate position” makes 
commercial speech “subject to modes of regulation that might be 
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.”71 
Contrasted with Cahill, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
anonymous speech in Anonymous Online did not involve expressly 
political speech, but rather, “speech related to the non-competition 
and non-solicitation provisions of Quixtar’s commercial 
contracts.”72
Although the Ninth Circuit denied the writs of mandamus at 
issue for procedural reasons, the Anonymous Online decision 
provides the backdrop for a useful discussion of the protection 
afforded to Internet free speech in the commercial context. Indeed, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anonymous Online may indicate 
that courts are lowering the bar for plaintiffs who attempt to 
unmask anonymous bloggers.  
  
 
                                                                                                         
68 See Julian A. Biggs, Not So Brave New World: Unmasking Anonymous 
Online Defamation, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Oct. 7, 2010.  
69 Anonymous Online, 2011 WL 61635, at *6.  
70 Id. at *2, (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978)).  
71 Bd. of Trs. of State. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) 
(quotations omitted) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978)).  
72 Anonymous Online, 2011 WL 61635, at *6. Although the court found that 
the speech in question was not “expressly political,” the court refused to decide 
if the speech at issue constitutes commercial speech under the Supreme Court’s 
definition in Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). Nevertheless, “even if the speech was commercial, the district court’s 
choice of the Cahill test did not constitute clear error.” 
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IV. WHY OTHER CIRCUITS WILL FOLLOW ANONYMOUS ONLINE’S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
 
Anonymous Online will remain influential in online defamation 
cases for two distinct reasons. First, writs of mandamus are 
universally considered an extraordinary form of relief and 
appellate courts commonly avoid discovery disputes.73
Second, Anonymous Online will continue to influence courts’ 
decision-making because many likely “subpoena targets,” such as 
Google, Yahoo!, and Bing are physically located in the Ninth 
Circuit, and are therefore bound by the precedent set in Anonymous 
Online.
 Therefore, 
very few appellate courts hear cases where plaintiffs in defamation 
cases seek to identify anonymous Internet commentators. Until the 
U.S. Supreme Court squarely addresses the proper disclosure test 
for commercial speech, it is likely that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
in Anonymous Online will remain the primary authority on the 
subject.  
74
The court in Anonymous Online held that courts should 
examine the nature of the speech at issue to determine whether the 
speech is commercial—and therefore subject to unmasking—or 
political, and thus protected by the First Amendment. This 
emphasis on the nature of the speech may create potential litigation 
problems for parties seeking to unmask anonymous commentators. 
For example, it is entirely possible that a party making defamatory 
statements could include both political and commercial statements 
in order to maintain anonymity while still causing significant harm. 
 Courts that have not selected a balancing test will most 
likely look to the Ninth Circuit as the circuit court that consistently 
deals with the most established and technologically prominent 
parties. 
In addition, basing the test on the nature of the anonymous 
speech at issue is problematic in cases where the true nature of the 
speech cannot be determined until after the author’s identity is 
revealed.75
                                                                                                         
73 See id. at *3.  
 For example, a cause of action for defamation relating 
74 Biggs, supra note 67.  
75 See id.  
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to the use of insider information might be predicated upon whether 
or not the author of alleged defamatory content is an employee of a 
plaintiff company, as opposed to whether the author is completely 
unaffiliated with the company.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Anonymous Online provides a useful standard for lower courts 
to follow when deciding whether to reveal the identity of an 
anonymous Internet user in a defamation lawsuit. First, the 
standard requires that the court determine the nature of the 
anonymous speech and decide whether that speech is commercial 
or political in nature. Second, the Ninth Circuit emphasizes that 
when speech is commercial, Internet anonymity warrants less First 
Amendment protection and therefore a less-demanding test for the 
plaintiff to attain revelation of an anonymous commentator. After 
Anonymous Online, the classification of certain speech as 
commercial or non-commercial will likely have substantial 
consequences for plaintiffs in Internet defamation cases. 
Nevertheless, Anonymous Online leaves some questions 
unanswered. While the court discussed the appropriate standard for 
commercial speech, it did not explicitly determine the threshold 
that must be met in order to uncover a politically motivated 
anonymous speaker. As such, the good faith standard, the prima 
facie case standard, or Cahill’s summary judgment standard may 
still be used in cases of alleged politically motivated defamation. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Defamation plaintiffs seeking the identity of an anonymous 
online commentator under Anonymous Online should 
demonstrate that the speech at issue is commercial in nature 
by looking to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Central Hudson 
decision. 
 Commercial speech under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Central Hudson means speech that is "related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience" and 
16
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goes to the heart of the plaintiff's commercial practices or 
its business operations.76
 If commercially motivated, the lawsuit should be framed as 
a commercial case.
 
77
 If the speech at issue is unquestionably politically 
motivated, the plaintiff’s most viable argument is to show 
that the speech meets a higher threshold test. Anonymous 
Online discussed the appropriate standard for commercial 
speech, indicating that the threshold is lower than the 
threshold for political speech, but the court did not 
explicitly determine the precise threshold that must be met 
in order to uncover the anonymous speaker in a politically 
motivated context. Here, courts may continue to look to the 
good faith standard, the prima facie case standard, or 
Cahill’s summary judgment standard to answer such 
requests. 
 Instead of filing a defamation 
complaint, it may be wiser to explicitly classify the cause 
of action as an economic tort, such as unfair competition or 
other unfair trade practices. 
  
                                                                                                         
76 Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980).  
77 See Biggs, supra note 67.  
 
17
Allen: Ninth Circuit Unmasks Anonymous Internet Users and Lowers the Bar
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
92 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 7:2 
 
18
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss2/2
